Thursday, August 30, 2007

India's N-deal

There's been a lot of attention to India's N-deal in the papers lately. Almost unanimously, the press has been in favour of the deal while berating the BJP and the Left for their "ideological opposition" while ignoring "national interests".

I have, in general, a very low opinion of opinion pieces. That's perhaps natural.

In this particular case, almost all the opinion pieces are almost uniformly ignorant and/or uncaring about the actual issues of the deal and the stated positions of the various parties.

I feel issues are important, institutions are important, rather than personalities. This is not a fight between a "spineless" PM putting his foot down against a recalcitrant left. What are the issues? I feel people will be interested in issues, but only if they're dealt with seriously.

In politics, it's very hard to talk to each other without having a shared narrative or basis of agreement. There are no easy ways to win debates. Here's my attempt to provide more perspective.

Let me raise a few questions, which I feel are relevant. People can find out about them or hear my opinions. These questions almost never come up in the media discussion on this, which is filled with hysteria.

Incidentally, I feel that much of this hysteria about "bringing down the govt." is totally unwarranted.

Let's go on to the issues:

0) What are the Indian people's positions on nuclear energy (civilian and military), US (generally and its adventures in the Middle East) and China?

It's amazing that I can't find good polls for this. One would've thought it would be an immediate and extensively studied question. I know that Indians generally do have a favourable opinion of the US, more than many others. But this is too vague a measure to be quite meaningful on specific issues.

1) What's the role of this deal in the larger Indo-US framework?
This is a question which can be looked at from many angles. A lot depends upon how we view the US role in world affairs.

Unquestionably, the US is very powerful. It's also unquestionably an imperial power bent on naked aggression as evidenced by Iraq and Afghanistan. These things aren't going to change much (contrary to Barkha Dutt's hopes) even if Bush is succeeded by someone from the Democrats. Both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton (as far as anyone can understand what they're saying - which is a task) support keeping some level of troops in Iraq and are trying to outdo each other in hawkish statements. These are things to keep in mind. We have to decide ourselves, which we feel is more important.

2) What're the consequences of the deal for nuclear proliferation?
India is a non NPT signatory. This means that, in the view of the international community, India cannot be trusted about whether it will use the fissile material to develop bombs. Certainly, Pakistan will assume the worst (as should any sane person). This is likely lead to an arms race in the region. We have to keep in mind that Pakistan is a known nuclear proliferator and a non-signatory to the NPT.

Similar statements hold for China.

3) What's the quid pro quo for the deal? In other words, no deals are one-off affairs. What's India letting itself in as part of the ongoing process with US?
One of the other deals which seems part of the quid pro quo seems to be the 10 year "defence" deal with the US and the arms deals with Israel.

We need to ask ourselves the question: do we need more arms? When so much of our population is living is horrendous poverty? India has one of the lowest expenditures on health and education in the world, no wonder, its human development index is comparable to sub-Saharan Africa. What should be our priorities?

4) What about energy issues? Also related is India's relations with Iran. How much of the future energy would nuclear power generate? Is it clean, inexpensive and plentiful? What about questions of self-sufficiency? And sovereignty? What will happen to the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline?

5) With regard to the Left's position on this matter: What exactly is their position? The question was asked rhetorically by Vir Sanghvi's article in HT, "What is the communist manifesto?" It seems strange that in the article he doesn't even try to find out their official position. Indeed, the deal itself gets scarce mention, amidst an orgy of left-bashing.

These are just the immediate questions which come to mind. To have not addressed these seriously shows a clear incompetence/bias/whatever in the media.

Here's an article which I found giving some more perspective (totally pro-Left, but gives some facts):

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There is something deeply reassuring about the corporate media's tirades against the Left in the context of the Left's opposition to India's nuclear deal with the US - the Left must be doing something right. And going by the shrillness of the attack, it's hitting where it hurts.

Look at only one newspaper, the Hindustan Times, over the last four days. On 16 August, CNN-IBN's Rajdeep Sardesai wrote on the Left's opposition to the nuclear deal. (http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=847b5aea-11f2-43fe-b221-67323df41c3d&ParentID=671f1d5e-8fad-4cc1-9e4e-65f5efb9c29e&&Headline=Karat and stick) The large bulk of his column is used to bash the Left, especially Prakash Karat, the CPM's General Secretary. Sardesai comes to the deal itself in the penultimate paragraph, only to tell us that "This is not about the details of the 123 agreement any longer, not even about a robust discussion on the country's energy needs, this is simply now about the unseen 'dangers' of forging a closer strategic relationship with the 'Evil Empire' in Washington." Since Left ideologues have "spent a lifetime seeing the world through the prism of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union has not meant the end of ideology." He accuses the Left of an "unwillingness to grow up, to recognise that while one has the legitimate right to oppose, the nature of the opposition cannot be such that it begins to resemble a spoilt brat who is being denied the entire cake of power."

Not a word on why the nuclear deal is in fact good for India.

Not to be outdone, Sardesai's former colleague, Barkha Dutt of NDTV 24x7, launched into the Left with gusto in her own column the following day. (http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=671f1d5e-8fad-4cc1-9e4e-65f5efb9c29e&&Headline=Left in a time warp) All the usual anti-Left clichés are there: the Left leaders are "dour faced," they sound like "Stalinists," who have the "government on its knees, blackmailed into submission." She counsels the Left to "put an ear to the ground." Translated into simple English, this means, listen to us. "The problem with the Left, . . . the reason for Modern India's disdain for them, is that while their heart is in the right place, their mind is woefully out of sync with our aspirations." These aspirations "take us westwards." Even though "we may oppose the war in Iraq and Afghanistan," "(our) future as global players is linked to the American dream," because "(we) know how to distinguish between Bush and the country he governs."

This is lovely. I oppose the war in Iraq and Afghanistan but don't ask what led to the war. I distinguish between Bush and the country he governs, which is why I trust the administration he heads to give us a treaty that is beneficial to us. And, since our future is linked to the American dream, I am confident that the Americans will never renege on that treaty, citing domestic law.

No wonder, then, that the details of the 123 agreement are "gobbledygook" to her.

The following day, it was Vir Sanghvi's turn. (http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=17e23240-f37f-460e-877b-61bca13067a5&&Headline=What are the Communists up to%3f) It has become mandatory to nod at the Left's clean image and to acknowledge that the Left leaders are "men - and women - of integrity and principle," and Sanghvi too does the needful: "In a political environment where only money and power seem to matter, the Left stands out as a grouping that believes in ideology and principle. Put the Politburo next to the Congress Working Committee or the BJP National Executive and even a child will be able to tell the difference in intelligence, stature and integrity."

There's some serious Left-bashing here. Sanghvi slyly suggests that "the CPI played no role in the freedom struggle;" but of course he is not saying it, he is merely reporting a "right-wing smear." But accounts of "global communist tyranny" are taken as fact: "Joseph Stalin killed 20 million people - over thrice the number killed by Adolf Hitler's Nazis. Figures for those who perished in China while the CPM was translating Chairman Mao's Little Red Book into Bengali are harder to come by, but a number of 50 million seems conservative (many accounts say it was 70 million)." Where these numbers have come from is obviously of no consequence.

Sanghvi's lament is that "when the UPA government was elected, the Left had a historic opportunity . . . to recast itself as a liberal force for good which held out against the power of multinationals, fought for the preservation of the environment, and defended the rights of the individual" - in other words, forget class issues, be blind to systems of exploitation, become namby-pamby do-gooders - but "sadly, the Left has blown this historic opportunity."

That is the problem. Prakash Karat and Sitaram Yechury walk like us, talk like us, why the hell can't they think like us? They'd be really nice guys, you know, if only they weren't commies.

And then there are the insinuations: it is alleged that "the UPA took the Left into confidence before signing the agreement," and therefore the Left's opposition is "no more than a politically expedient afterthought."

What stands out in all these tirades against the Left is, of course, the unwillingness to discuss the issue at hand. To my mind, The Hindu is the only paper that has seriously and consistently gone into the specifics of the deal, and tracked it over time. See, for instance, Siddharth Varadarajan's piece of August 20. (http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/20/stories/2007082058271500.htm) While the paper has endorsed the 123 agreement itself editorially, it has suggested that the agreement be put on hold while the government schedules "an earnest round of all-party discussions, which must take in objections, apprehensions, reservations, and questions relating to the nuclear deal that have come from all serious quarters."

All the others, Hindustan Times, Times of India, Indian Express, Pioneer, the whole lot of them, have turned the nuclear deal into what Barkha Dutt so eloquently described as "gobbledygook."

Since the deal itself is "gobbledygook," the Left's opposition is variously characterized as an ego clash between Prakash Karat and Manmohan Singh (which is the surest way of trivializing an issue), as blind anti-Americanism (but not anti-imperialism), or as betrayal of confidence (though we are never told when exactly the Left's consent for the deal was actually acquired).

Then there is the other bogey: India's energy security. Sagarika Ghosh of CNN-IBN put the question to CPM's Mohd. Salim on live television on the night of August 20 saying "no deal, no bijli (electricity)." Salim asked her a simple question: how much electricity are we going to get from this deal, and when? Ghosh was silent. Salim repeated the question. Silence. When Salim began answering his own question, Ghosh cut him off, with a question about the Left's "anti-Americanism." (For the record, nuclear energy satisfies 3% of India's energy needs currently, which is expected to go up to 7% by 2020.) And, while on energy, why isn't anyone asking what will happen to the gas pipeline from Iran?

As for the Left's actual opposition to the deal, and the reasoning behind that opposition, it never existed. Accordingly, you hear a tone of injured exasperation - "what IS the communist manifesto?", as Sanghvi's piece was titled.

Well, all they need to do is to recall recent history: the Left has opposed the deal consistently ever since 2005, when the Indian Prime Minister and the American President issued their famous joint statement in July, which itself came on the back of the 10-year Defence Framework Agreement. The Left has reiterated again and again that the nuclear deal has to be seen in the context of the larger strategic aims of the U.S., in which it sees India becoming an imperial largest outpost in South Asia. The Left's vigorous opposition forced the Prime Minister to give assurances to the Indian Parliament exactly an year ago, on August 17, 2006. (For a sober statement of the Left's objections, see Prakash Karat's article, "Why the CPI(M) and the Left oppose the nuclear deal," available at http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/20/stories/2007082058071400.htm)

One would have expected the media and commentators to put a simple question to the Left: you had expressed satisfaction at the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament in August 2006, so how do you think the present 123 agreement reneges on those assurances?

But this is a vain hope. Because the moment you ask this question, you admit that the Left's opposition has not materialized all of a sudden, out of thin air. Even more importantly, you focus on issues.

That is quite simply the last thing the corporate media wants. Any criticism - or even mention - of the American imperial project is a strict no-no.

Obeisance to the master is the order of the day. The rest is gobbledygook.
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Here's also a blog entry discussing the deal.

9 comments:

Srinivasan Ramani said...

Extremely well written. I am already composing a piece on the strategic part of the argument.. i.e. on the features of India's time tested foreign policy and how it stands to get affected (and consequently to India's detriment) because of the strategic re-alignment through the aegis of the nuclear deal. In the upcoming issue of the EPW, Kamal Mitra Chenoy and Anuradha Chenoy also write about this with more emphasis.

www.pragoti.org holds a repository of articles on various issues and you will find relevant ones on the deal too from various aspects (strategic, technical, nationalist and leftist positions).

www.flonnet.com .. This week's Frontline has an article by R.Ramachandran which lies threadbare the energy requirement details that have been harped upon very clearly with introductions to India's indigenous nuclear energy programme and ambitions to develop the Three stage Nuclear Energy programme through the eventual usage of Thorium reactors.. Please do read the same.

www.epw.org.in has several articles on the criticisms made on the dependence on nuclear energy itself too..in case you don't mind getting a bit obfuscated by the whole load of matter on the issue :)

There are other material too that might interest you. Please send me a test email at srinivasan.vr@gmail.com ..

Unknown said...

One more thing. Can you please tell me who wrote the article that you have published in your blog? A.S.A.P

Thanks!

Karan Vaswani said...

Kapil Sibal on the N-Deal:
The Left is not right on nuclear deal
Kapil Sibal

Posted online: Wednesday, September 05, 2007

Contrary to what Prakash Karat says, the 123 Agreement will allow India opportunities to be an important player in a competitive world, instead of negatively impacting its sovereignty

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Of late, we have had a relatively informed debate on diverse aspects of the Indo-US civil nuclear energy cooperation. The crystallized CPI(M) opposition is spelt out in its pamphlet on the “Indo-US Nuclear Deal”. For the last one year, after Parliament was informed of the proposed Separation Plan, opposition mainly centred around the commitments made and assurances given by the Prime Minister before the negotiation of the 123 Agreement. The Left parties insisted that the 123 Agreement must reflect the fulfilment of those assurances. There was no real debate on the larger US design, affecting India’s sovereignty and of course making India sub-serve the military and strategic interests of the USA. There has now been a perceptible shift in the Left position, which now seeks to address the larger issue of the advisability of collaborating with the US in the field of agriculture, industry and proximity of ties pursuant to the Defence Framework Agreement and the joint exercises conducted by the two military establishments. The allegation now is that civil nuclear energy cooperation is really a part of the larger enterprise through which the US seeks to control our foreign policy and negatively impact our sovereignty.

Before addressing the nature of opposition by Prakash Karat & Co, it is important to look at the dynamic nature of global politics, the challenges that India needs to address in the coming years and the importance of forging close ties with major players in a globally changed environment. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the former USSR, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Warsaw Pact, the emergence of China as a key Asian power and the formation of the European Union has changed the context of the relations between nation-states in the 21st century. The world hopes to move from uni-polarity to multi-polarity. India, ever since we opened up our economy, has in the last 16 years been recognised as a significant global player and is welcomed by the G8 as an active participant in global policy-making. India must, in an ever-changing world, recognise the role that it is destined to play and the leadership of India must, in the national interest, ensure that we contribute our might in policy-making to meet the emerging global challenges consistent with our national self-interest. India needs to establish friendly relations with key global players: the USA, Russia, China, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Brazil, South Africa and others. Foreign policy is a dynamic enterprise, which addresses the realities of today in the context of our concerns for tomorrow. Knowledge is the driver of the 21st century global economy. It is against our national interest to adopt postures and embrace policies that will isolate our people. The prejudices of yesterday cannot become the cornerstone of today’s politics. Had that been so, Vietnam would never have forged such close ties with the US: 10 lakh Vietnamese having been massacred by US forces. The nations of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact countries are now a part of NATO. And the free flow of traffic along Checkpoint Charlie shows how the dynamics of change overcomes deeply felt prejudices. China has embraced capitalist policies like fish takes to water; and Russia collaborates with the West to serve their national interest. In this ever changing world, why should India remain static? The Common Minimum Programme is not in the nature of a Stand-Still Agreement with the Left. India cannot remain Still and Standing while the world moves on.

Karat concludes, unfortunately, that “it is evident that without the Defence Agreement, the Americans would not have agreed for the Nuclear Cooperation, this seems part of the quid-pro-quo”. The Defence Agreement in fact owes its genesis to the agreed minutes on the relations between US and India signed in January, 1995. Then came Pokhran II in 1998 and the consequent imposition of sanctions. In 2001, the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership with the United States of America was forged by Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, wherein India and the US agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas: Civilian Nuclear Activities, Civilian Space Programmes and High Technology Trade. In addition to this was the agreement to expand a dialogue on missile defence and cooperation in the area of commerce. The strategic partnership between India and the US is not the brainchild of one political party. It is the recognition of the confluence of interests in an ever changing world, interests which seek to address common cherished values like rule of law, mutual desire to maintain stability and security, defeating terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction & associated material, data and technology. For Karat to opine that the civil nuclear energy cooperation was a “quid-pro-quo”, contingent upon India agreeing to a Defence Arrangement betrays lack of understanding of contemporary politics and the dynamics of change.

Karat further states that the decision of the UPA government to vote along with the US and western countries in September, 2005 on the Iran nuclear issue reflected the subservience of Indian foreign policy to US’s interests. He goes on to state that India was not even prepared to go along with the position adopted by the block of ‘non-alignment’ movement countries. Non-alignment historically was a response to Cold War politics, but in the contemporary world, it means independence of decision-making. I don’t know why Karat assumes India’s vote with the US on the Iran nuclear issue a mortgage of our foreign policy interests. Karat is surely aware of the fact that only one Muslim country namely Syria voted against the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors on September 24, 2005. Of the 35 countries, 22 voted in favour, 1 against with 12 abstentions. Karat also knows that some of the main collaborators in Iran’s nuclear programme, despite the fact that Iran was a signatory to the NPT, are those who are opposed to us. On February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution requesting the IAEA Director General to report to the UN Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to the implementation of safeguards in Iran. Here too, 27 countries voted in favour, 3 against and 5 abstentions. Egypt and Yemen, which have significant Shia population voted in favour and Indonesia, Libya and Algeria abstained. A majority of non-aligned nations voted for the resolution. China and the Russian Federation supported the resolution. Going by the majority rule, a large majority, both on September 24, 2005 and on February 4, 2006 voted against Iran. Karat gives great credence to majorities especially a cobbled opportunistic majority in Parliament. On that logic he must support the majority verdict when it comes to Iran. Conclusions based on selective facts are no substitute to an informed decision.

Karat emphasizes the limited contribution that nuclear power will make to our overall power generation, which is just 3% and it cannot exceed 7% even if its ambitious plans for expansion are implemented by 2020.

The argument defies logic. With exponential growth in demand and on the assumption that the economy will continue to grow at 8 to 9%, the demand for electricity in 2020 will be around 4,48,000 megawatts. By 2030, it is expected to be anything between 8,00,000 to 10,00,000 megawatts. 7% of a million megawatts is 70,000, from the present mere 2,700 megawatts. This cannot be regarded as a limited contribution. These are conservative estimates. By opening up the civil nuclear energy sector to investments and by allowing private players a significant role, we can enhance our estimated levels of generation at least two-fold. In the process, with the scientific expertise in civil nuclear energy available in India, we can in fact hope to export some of these technologies and build nuclear reactors for other countries to meet global demand.

The 21st century will require us to source clean energy from all available options. It will be necessary to expand our basket of options by looking at alternative sources of energy. Bio-fuels, Solar Energy, Wind Power are possible options. As far as Thermal Power is concerned, with open cast mining, the potential for polluting the environment is frightening. In order to modernize the coal sector, we need again the Left to collaborate, in order to use clean coal technologies for generation of power. Our coal reserves are estimated to be 247 billion tonnes with proven reserves of about 93 billion tones. Our reliance on coal will continue though present coal production capacity is already strained. We need huge investments in the coal sector, which again are not forthcoming because of our antiquated policies and legislation. The Left resists any attempt to change this also. The argument that Thermal Power is cheaper is also somewhat misconceived. If coal sequestration is to take place and carbon dioxide captured or coal were to be liquefied, input costs in technology up-gradation would also make coal a relatively expensive proposition. Hydro Electric Power generation must also be augmented to meet increasing demand. All sources of energy therefore, need be accessed to meet the potentially large gap between demand and supply. The drawback of both Thermal and Hydro Electric Power is that power plants must be close to the pithead and along the run of the river, respectively, far away from consumers, making transmission losses, an impediment to full utilization. To consider Nuclear Energy as a limited source of energy is to ignore, at your own peril, a vital source of energy necessary to meet our developmental needs.

Karat then states that the Hyde Act and its provisions run contrary to the assurance given by the Prime Minister in August, 2006. The 123 Agreement, after it is accorded the approval of Congress, will be the “last expression of the sovereign will” and the Hyde Act being prior in any point of time cannot possibly override the provisions of the 123 Agreement. He has also not indicated as to how any assurance of the Prime Minister runs contrary to the Hyde Act. Indeed the assurances given by the Prime Minister on the floor of the House in August, 2006 have all been met. The nuclear fuel supply cycle as enunciated by the Prime Minister in August, has nothing to do with access to dual-use technologies. The Prime Minister never gave any assurance about access to dual-use technologies. The assurance of the Prime Minister related to sourcing nuclear fuel, its assured supply, import of nuclear reactors and the right to reprocess spent fuel. All these assurances have been fulfilled. In the context of the 123 Agreement, India is only bound by the terms there-of and not by any extraneous domestic legislation of the United States, which seeks to influence the President of the United States. Any prescriptions in the Hyde Act with reference to India’s foreign policy are neither binding on India nor will our foreign policy decisions be influenced directly or indirectly by the domestic law of any country.

We accord great importance to the fact that we have been able to work together as a secular entity along with the Left and put in place policies and programmes, which are historic. The 123 Agreement, instead of impacting negatively on our sovereignty will allow us to be global players in a competitive world, Karats’ arguments to the contrary, not-withstanding.

Anand said...

Karan:

First, let me comment that Sibal only partially addresses my questions (since they are more extensive than the articulate Left's objections). Many of the big questions are not addressed, like non-proliferation, cost-benefit analysis of nuclear energy, position of Indian citizens on the deal and many others.

That said, here are my comments.

0) The entire second paragraph is misleading and unacceptable in my opinion. It puts up a straw man. Nobody in his right mind says that India ought to cut itself off from the US (or any other country for that matter). This is just a thinly-veiled "the Left is anti-American" charge. The opposition is specific, not a sweeping condemnation of everything American, though some people like to paint it that way. There are many things to object to in American policy, just as there are many things to object to in Indian policy. That doesn't make me "anti-Indian".

1) Let's look at the defence deal. First, let's consider the statement:
"It is the recognition of the confluence of interests in an ever changing world, interests which seek to address common cherished values like rule of law, mutual desire to maintain stability and security, defeating terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction & associated material, data and technology."

It's amazing Sibal can say this with a straight face. Almost everything there is a total opposite to what the US is doing. US following international law? Bad joke. Countering terrorism? How about we kill a million people in Iraq? Going after WMD? Yeah, right. How about putting pressure on it's main ally in the Middle East, Israel, to come clean on its 100 nukes?

As to the specific comment about the US Defence Agreement going back to 1995, he's right. It's not the "brainchild of one political party". However, what does that have to do with anything? We can oppose specifics of the deal whether NDA does it or the UPA.

The coherent opposition has long been claiming that the deal is a part of a larger picture. Just because some part of the picture was started by someone else doesn't mean we have to fully complete it.

2) The Iran issue: I'll give a coherent discussion on this in a later article. However, to me, it's clear that the vote against Iran in Sep 2005 was clearly coerced and was counterproductive in many ways. In fact, even in the draft resolution of the IAEA, India thought Iran was not in violation of the NPT and was not a threat to international security.

That's just one part of a long story. Space doesn't permit me to go into it, but the Iran issue is a major embarassment to India, I feel. As to NAM, the non-aligned members abstained from the fatally flawed resolution. To me, it's clear that India is being sucked into unfair politics and it will share a measure of guilt if the US does attack Iran.

3) On nuclear energy. Sibal fails to provide a good defence of nuclear energy, imho. He doesn't do a cost-benefit analysis. My views on nuclear energy are ill-defined, so I don't want to take a position yet. However, it's clear that nuclear energy will be a very minor component of India's energy needs for some time to come. Also see this:

Would India face a power crisis if the 123 agreement had not come through? “We are self-sufficient in our technology. Our nuclear power programme is moving extremely well,” he said.

I won't comment on the Left's position on coal, because I don't have enough information. Again, I feel it's at best of minor relevance to the issue we're discussing.

4) Hyde Act: Space again doesn't allow me to go into a fuller discussion. See this for some of the relevant issues. Ignore the rhetoric, concentrate on section III and IV. If you look at the various provisions of the Hyde Act, it seems clear to me India is acting very consciously in accord with it (including the Iran issue). This is flatly inconsistent with Sibal's claim, and speaking for myself, I don't believe him, especially after looking at various statements by American diplomats.

Vinod_Sharma said...

The Left has become just that:'left'. Even Chinese commies have left the Left.But the Left still wants to keep living in the beginning of 20th century. I cringe when someone intelligent asks the question'Do we need more arms?', and promptly talks of poverty. I don't know why our 'Left' behind guys remain completely blind to what their Chinese brothers have been doing for their nation for the last five decades, and how.
Somehow, we still seem not to understand that India is a really huge nation of 1.2 billion people, not much smaller than China. The difference?The Chinese compete with and want to eventually beat much bigger USA, militarily and economically; India is happy competing with a nation 1/3 its size and pretending China does not exist. Nations that think small remain small.
If you wish to, do read my posts somewhere on my blog.

Karan Vaswani said...

Hmmmm....
1. The Left's opposition is clearly to an alliance with the United States. There is no such opposition to, say, closer links with Russia. Now it may be argued that the Left is opposing an asymmetrical alliance rather than an alliance per se, but I don't buy it. If that were indeed so, the smart thing to do would be to forge the relationship first, and then renegotiate it from a stronger position later. This reminds me of how the U.S. extended MFN status to China in 1979, subject to annual renewal. Annual renewal was supposed to be conditional on compliance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment on emigration, and with improvement on human rights and weapons proliferation, etc. The Chinese went along quietly, knowing that annual renewal provisions would be meaningless once strong trade interdependence had been created. After Tiananmen, a lot of Congressional noises were made about terminating China's MFN status, and every year from 1989 and 1999 legislation was introduced to disapprove the President's annual waiver of Jackson-Vanik; a bill to that effect got as far as a Presidential veto from George H.W. Bush in 1992. The Chinese simply kept deepening the trade relationship. In 1994, Clinton severed the link between human rights practices and MFN renewal. And in 1999, Congress granted permanent normal trade relations (or permanent MFN status) to China, allowing China to join the WTO in 2000. The annual renewal provisions weren't worth much as a way of influencing China's domestic or foreign policies in the long-term, in the face of China's growing importance.
2. I feel the Iran issue is a red herring. The U.S. is clearly unable to invade Iran for the foreseeable future, so let's take that pretense off the table. And we've certainly voted in unjustifiable ways in the U.N. before -- at least this time it's part of a tangible package of benefits. U.N. security council resolutions clearly don't mean very much in today's world, do they? :) Five years from now, the vote will be one of hundreds long since forgotten, but our strategic ties with the U.S. will be real. For what it's worth, I have no problem with a nuclear Israel, anymore than I have a problem with a nuclear India, and while I agree that U.S. portrayals of the Iranian leadership as unfit to have nuclear weapons are overhyped, the idea of Iran having nukes nevertheless does not sit entirely well with me. For one thing, it would change the balance of power in the Middle East, which is no more in our strategic interests than in the Americans' and Israelis'. And for another, I don't think Iran's regime is necessarily the most stable in the world, and we have enough worries with the growing instability in nuclearized Pakistan. So if the U.S. wants to block Iran's efforts to nuclearize, and maintain the nuclear status quo and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East, I have absolutely no objections to that.
3. I agree that no cost benefit analysis has been offered, and I frankly agree that nuclear energy will remain a minor source of energy at best. I also completely agree that waste disposal is a massive problem, as is the issue of potential nuclear accidents. For me personally, the importance of this deal has very little to do with nuclear energy, and everything to do with making a commitment to an abiding strategic alliance with the U.S., which I support. The nuclear deal is just one of several vehicles being used to forge that alliance.
4. There's short-term behavior and long-term behavior. In the short-term, by all means let's appease the Americans by making a few noises on Iran in return for recognition of our right to be a full member of the nuclear club, and for recognition of our right to pre-eminence in South Asia, rather than coupling us with Pakistan. After the next election cycle in the U.S., the Iran issue may well be on the back burner anyway.
5. As far as the position of Indian citizens on the deal goes, well, frankly, we are not Sweden or Finland, where most citizens might be expected to have a fair conception of foreign policy and, thereby, the ability and the inclination to actually form particular views on these kinds of issues; in India, general opinion polls will not tell us very much, because people in rural Chhattisgarh and Andhra simply do not care, one way or the other. The middle classes are the ones who do have a point of view -- and the consensus among them is clearly a pro-American one. On a different note: Almost all great powers are imperialist, whether through direct military intervention or other means; there's no point in decrying this. The Chinese, Russians, Japanese, etc have all had their own imperial projects in the past too. It's just that China and Russia are unable to match the U.S.'s power projection capabilities at present. So I wouldn't allow American imperialism in Iraq and Afghanistan (which I oppose, but not with any particular moral fervor, let me hasten to add) to sway me against a close strategic relationship with the U.S. As far as rule of law goes, do you really believe that has ever applied in the face of stark power assymetries? The League of Nations wasn't exactly able to do much about Abyssinia or Manchuria. And the U.N. wasn't exactly able to do much about a host of situations in the face of superpower vetos.
6. Let's indeed look at this nuclear deal as part of a larger process. Then let's ask ourselves what will come next, and ask whether those further developments will be desirable. We will probably acquire American armaments, true. However, we will also continue to use Russia as our major supplier for the foreseeable future; we're not stupid enough to discontinue that longstanding supply relationship. We will simply be diversifying our weapons stock and the technologies available to us. I'm sure there will be a lot of official localization of the technology, as well as a lot of unofficial reverse engineering. :) We will probably have far greater naval co-operation with the U.S., Australia, Japan and other regional powers. In the long-term, we might even build or acquire more aircraft carriers. In the very long-term, this will help us carve out the Indian Ocean area as our natural sphere of influence, while China will focus on Central Asia and the Pacific, bringing them into competition with the U.S. and Japan.

I said...

reeks of ignorance.

Vinod_Sharma said...

Analysis of Karan Vaswani is superb and sums up what India really needs to do, something which the Left have never understood.Why do you think they never joined this government and even earlier made a historical blunder by not letting Jyoti Basu become the PM?

Karan Vaswani said...

Funny thing. People in the media have also picked up on the parallel of Chinese trade agreements, although instead of looking at the MFN deals of the '80s and '90s, they've looked at China's accession to the WTO:

TCA Srinivasa-Raghavan: China and sovereignty

LINE & LENGTH

T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan / New Delhi September 08, 2007


Why did China crawl before the US to get into the WTO? Because of the benefits of joining.

The politburo of the CPM has made a big song and dance about India’s sovereignty in the context of the Indo-US nuclear deal. It has also said the same thing in respect of defence co-operation between India and the US.

It is easy to see why the politburo is so worked up about the latter. If India and the US join hands militarily, China suffers.

But sovereignty is a little more complex. So let us see how China approaches it. Specifically, let us see how it abridged its sovereignty when it wanted to enter the WTO. The US made it crawl on all fours, and China agreed because it assessed the benefits of crawling correctly.

Given below is a very brief summary what China agreed to do. You can get the full Protocol of Accession from the WTO website.

Thus, China agreed to:
1. Undertake systemic reforms for making the system transparent, predictable and fair to the US and other foreigners in business dealings;

2. Observe all obligations of WTO agreements, with very brief transition periods and only where necessary (necessity was determined by the US);

3. Liberalise its trade in a way that would improve foreigners’ (mainly US) market access across all sectors. Compare this to the Unfair Treaties of 1841. There isn’t much difference;

4. Hugely reduce tariffs on industrial and agricultural goods of importance to US businesses and farmers;

5. Make massive commitments on services that would substantially increase market access for US services suppliers; and so on. The details of the surrender are embarrassing.

The kicker came in enforcement. China agreed to a special multilateral mechanism that would undertake an annual review of its performance and to “special safeguard mechanisms” for protecting businesses, farmers and workers of WTO members (read US). It also agreed to several conditions that would apply only to China, which meant that there was to be no reciprocity.

It agreed to do away with the trading rights system, under which only some companies had had such rights. Henceforth all would be free to trade. Joint ventures with foreigners were granted full rights. China bowed on distribution rights also. All restrictions on foreigners (read US firms) went. It also agreed to abolish all quotas and licences that covered hundreds of things.

It agreed to end the monopoly of state-owned enterprises on imports and to provide full information on the pricing mechanisms of these enterprises. Indeed, henceforth the SOEs would “limit the mark-up on goods” that they imported and to ensure that the state-owned or state-invested enterprises would be subject to WTO rules. And there was an Annexure to the agreement. In this China agreed not to “use price controls to restrict the level of imports of goods or services”.

China agreed to totally eliminate tariffs on computers, semiconductors and other information technology products by January 1, 2005. It agreed to implement tariff reductions “on more than two-thirds of the 1,100-plus products covered by the WTO’s Chemical Tariff Harmonization Agreement”. Tariffs on cars were to be cut by 100 per cent, on autos to 9.5 per cent. It agreed that tariffs on farm products that the Americans were interested in would be reduced from 31 per cent to 14 per cent.

But the US was not done yet. There were services, too, to be opened up. China committed itself to opening up its markets in banking, insurance, telecommunications and professional services. Guess who benefited the most. The US, naturally.

For enforcing all this, a mechanism was created which required China to report, hat in hand, to all WTO members. And, there was a unique China-specific safeguard that allowed members to limit imports from China if they felt like. There was a textiles safeguard as well for the same purpose.

The US also forced China to grant to it the sole right in deciding what was acceptable. “Where the US government finds compliance problems, it will act quickly to resolve them through all available mechanisms… bilateral means, including US trade laws… as necessary.” This was the American interpretation.

The US legislature passed a law in 2000 which, among other things, established a “special Congressional-Executive commission to monitor, and report on, various aspects of China’s policies on human rights, including labor practices and religious freedom; codified the anti-surge mechanism established under the November 1999 U.S.-China trade agreement and establishes procedures for obtaining relief from import surges; set up a special government task force to halt U.S. imports from China of products suspected of using prison labor; and authorized funding for programs to promote the development of the rule of law in China.”

But enough said. The point is clear. The results of this surrender of sovereignty, which is what it was, were entirely beneficial to China. Its trade surplus with the US for the first seven months of 2007 was almost $25 billion and it holds almost $900 billion in US securities. Even if the US wants to, it can’t implement the utterly humiliating conditions it made China accept in 1999. There is simply too much at stake for it.

How could proud China bow and scrape like this? Could it be because there is no CPM in China?